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European labor markets are characterized by two main features. First, labor turnover costs in the
form of hiring and ￿ring costs are very high (see next section for stylized facts). Second, in most
countries wages are bargained ex-ante at a centralized level and the bargaining process usually takes
place between ￿rms and employed workers. There is ample empirical evidence that large turnover
costs induce much persistence in worker ￿ ows, a phenomenon which has been labeled Eurosclerosis1
(see among others Kugler and Saint-Paul 2004). In addition it has been noticed that labor turnover
costs coupled with the inability of wages to adjust promptly to idiosyncratic shocks, e.g., due to
collective bargaining processes, induces ine¢ ciently high levels of unemployment.2 Persistence in
worker ￿ ows and the inability of labor markets to adjust promptly to shocks alongside with the
presence of ine¢ ciently high unemployment rates induces severe trade-o⁄s for monetary policy. The
literature has so far neglected them in the analysis of optimal monetary policy. There is a ￿ ourishing
literature studying optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian settings whose conclusions invariably
lead to support the case for the optimality of price stability policy. In most cases those prescriptions
are derived in an environment which lacked any signi￿cant role for labor market frictions. The
analysis in this paper moves a step forward in this direction focusing on a type of labor market
friction which ￿ts well the euro area countries.
The design of optimal monetary policy is done within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model with sticky prices and labor market frictions. The labor market considered here
is characterized by two main features. First, worker/￿rm relations are subject to idiosyncratic
operating costs and turnover costs in the form of hiring and ￿ring costs. As worker/￿rm pairs are
heterogenous, the marginal worker is hired only when the future stream of discounted expected
pro￿ts exceed hiring costs.3 The same holds for ￿ring decisions. In the absence of labor turnover
costs, a worker￿ s current employment probability is independent of whether she was previously
employed or unemployed, so that her retention rate is equal to her job ￿nding rate. In the presence of
hiring and ￿ring costs, by contrast, her retention rate exceeds her job ￿nding rate, and thus current
1Giersch 1985 ￿rst introduced this terminology which has then been used by several others to describe European
labor markets.
2See for instance Bertola and Rogerson 1997.
3See also Lechthaler, Merkl, and Snower 2008 for a prototype of this model economy.
1employment depends on past employment. Such path dependence allows the model dynamics
to show additional persistence compared to standard Walrasian labor markets, something in line
with empirical evidence. Second, the wage setting mechanism in our model follows a right to
manage bargaining,4 which takes place between ￿rms and the median worker.5 This type of wage
bargaining has an important implication: Due to the right to manage structure hiring and ￿ring
decisions are taken only after the wage schedule has been determined; this implies that, consistently
with empirical evidence, shocks have a large impact on employment.6
Our model economy features two types of distortions. On the one side, sticky prices call for
optimality of zero in￿ ation policy. On the other side, the presence of labor market frictions which
generate ine¢ ciently low levels of employment call for an active monetary policy with short-run
deviations from zero in￿ ation. Those two forces produce a trade-o⁄ for the policy maker. Impor-
tantly, the speci￿c form of labor market frictions employed in our model allows us to highlight novel
dimensions in the analysis of monetary policy trade-o⁄s. First, hiring and ￿ring costs reduce labor
turnover at any period in time, therefore inducing a gap compared to the economy characterized by
Walrasian labor markets. Second, the model features an intertemporal wedge that distorts hiring
and ￿ring decision between two subsequent periods. Indeed, once workers are inside the ￿rm they
are ￿red only if the discounted stream of future pro￿ts is smaller than the negative value of the
￿ring costs. Further, ￿rms will hire only if the discounted value of future pro￿ts is bigger than the
hiring costs. As a consequence, the retention rate, de￿ned as the mass of workers who keep their
jobs, is always bigger than the ￿ring rate. Under those circumstances current employees and ￿rms
extract some rents. Importantly it should be noticed that the wedge between the planner solution
(with full employment) and our competitive economy has a time varying nature, hence it cannot be
o⁄-set with a constant ￿scal subsidy but requires contingent policy responses. Third, the marginal
cost in this model embeds an extra component given by the long run value of a worker: ￿rms tend
to retain workers as this allows them to save ￿ring and hiring costs. This additional component
4This feature captures well the reality of European labor markets in which wage schedules are typically determined
ex-ante through collective bargaining agreement.
5The choice of allowing the median worker to bargain over wages simpli￿es the model. However, robustness checks
show that alternative settings, such as individual bargaining process with marginal workers, would not change the
main implications of the model and the main policy trade-o⁄s.
6For a more thorough analysis of this issue in a related labor market framework without price adjustment costs,
see Brown, Merkl, and Snower 2009.
2acts as an endogenous cost push shock and prevents the marginal cost from being constant on the
￿ exible price allocation. Finally, in the right to manage bargaining, wages are not contingent on
current employment decisions, therefore they lose part of their allocative role compared to the case
with e¢ cient Nash bargaining. Ex-post unemployment rates are ine¢ ciently high, something which
calls for active policy responses.
The analysis of optimal monetary policy is carried in three steps. First, the analysis highlights
the role of wedges in driving monetary policy trade-o⁄s. Second, the design of optimal policy starts
by deriving the Ramsey approach (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976, Lucas and Stokey 1983, Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe 1991) in which the optimal path of all variables is obtained by maximizing
agents￿welfare subject to the relations describing the competitive economy and via an explicit
consideration of all wedges that characterize both the long run and the cyclical dynamics. Recent
studies apply this approach to the analysis of optimal policy in the context of New Keynesian
models (Adao et al. 2003, Khan, King, and Wolman 2003, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2007 and
Siu 2004). Third, the design of optimal policy is completed by the characterization of an optimal
operational monetary policy rule, the latter is obtained numerically by maximizing agents￿welfare
subject to the competitive economy conditions. Crucial in our numerical analysis is the use of
second order approximations and conditional welfare, which allows to account for second order
e⁄ects on mean welfare, something which acquires particular relevance in presence of large real
distortions.
We ￿nd three main results. First, optimal policy implies deviations from price stability. Con-
sider a positive productivity shock. As output and employment are below the Pareto optimal level,
the monetary authority should take full advantage of the productivity improvement to push the
real economy towards the Pareto frontier. In an economy with sticky prices, it can do so by increas-
ing aggregate demand: such an increase will in turn increase labor demand, hence increase hiring
and reduce ￿ring. Second, we ￿nd that the optimal volatility of in￿ ation is an increasing function
of the ￿ring costs. This result has two alternative interpretations. First, higher ￿ring costs, by
exacerbating ine¢ cient unemployment ￿ uctuations, steepen the monetary policy trade-o⁄ between
stabilizing prices and reducing ine¢ ciencies. Second, from a public ￿nance point of view, in￿ ation
in this model act as a tax on ￿rms￿rents: the higher the hiring and ￿ring costs, the higher are
3the rents that accrue to ￿rms, hence the larger are the ￿ uctuations in the in￿ ation tax. Finally,
we ￿nd that the optimal monetary policy rule should target employment alongside with in￿ ation.
Once again the need for targeting the real activity alongside with in￿ ation results from the nature
of the policy trade-o⁄s in this model.
Our paper is related to a recent literature that introduces labor market frictions in New
Keynesian models. Most of the literature though has focused on search and matching frictions.7
Our model presents a novel approach to modeling labor market frictions in New Keynesian models
and highlights alternative monetary policy trade-o⁄s.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows some stylized facts relating the
dynamics of selected macro variable and labor turnover costs. Section 3 presents the model and
highlights the role of frictions in this economy. Section 4 presents the full-￿ edged Ramsey plan
while section 5 presents the analysis of the optimal rule. Finally section 6 concludes.
2 Labor Turnover Costs and Euro Area Labor Markets
There is a vast literature looking at the importance of labor turnover costs and employment protec-
tion legislation (with the latter considered as proxy for ￿ring costs) for unemployment dynamics,
particularly for euro area labor markets. The literature dates back to Solow 1968, Sargent 1978,
Nickell 1978, 1986 who introduce adjustment costs on labor demand. More recently, Bentolila and
Bertola 1990 and Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993 have shown that hiring and ￿ring costs reduce
labor turnover and make unemployment dynamics more persistent. Moreover, Hopenhayn and
Rogerson 1993 and Bertola and Rogerson 1997 ￿nd that turnover costs have a sizable negative
impact on unemployment, possibly leading to ine¢ cient unemployment ￿ uctuations. Kugler and
Saint-Paul 2004 show that this is even more so if turnover costs are coupled with asymmetric in-
formation. Finally, Alvarez and Veracierto 2001 ￿nd that severance payments decrease aggregate
productivity and output.
Before turning to the model￿ s implications, it is useful to highlight some stylized facts con-
cerning the impact of labor turnover costs on the dynamics of selected macro variables, speci￿cally
in￿ ation and output. We focus on euro area countries. Figures 1 and 2 show that there is a
7Several contributions exist. See, e.g., Walsh 2005 and Krause and Lubik 2007. Within this literature some
authors have studied the design of optimal policy (see Blanchard and Gal￿ 2009, Faia 2008, 2009 and Thomas 2008).
4negative and signi￿cant relationship between labor turnover costs and the volatility of output and
in￿ ation. As argued before, higher labor turnover costs imply that the retention rates exceed job
￿nding rates,8 and thus current employment depends on past employment. The persistence in
employment carries over to output, marginal costs and therefore to in￿ ation. The data sample
covers years from the 1999 to mid-2008. This choice is motivated by the following reasons. First,
the interest in studying the recent implications of labor market regulations for macroeconomic
dynamics. Second, the need to isolate the dynamics of macro variables from policy regime shifts
and thereby the choice to focus on the EMU period. The volatility of real economic activity is
calculated based on a quarterly output gap measure. The seasonally adjusted real GDP series (in
2000 prices) is taken from the International Financial Statistics. The output gap is calculated as
percentage deviation of output from its trend, namely the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter with smoothing
parameter ￿ = 1600. The in￿ ation gap volatility is calculated in the same way.9
As a proxy for labor turnover costs we use the employment protection legislation index (see
OECD 2004), which is a weighted average of indicators capturing protection of regular workers
against individual dismissals, requirements for collective dismissals and regulation of temporary
employment. We choose this index because it is a more precise measure than alternative employ-
ment protection indicators.10 Figure 3 shows values of this index for various countries. It becomes
immediately clear that turnover costs are much smaller in the anglo-saxon countries. European
countries generally have considerably higher index values than anglo-saxon countries, although even
among European countries there is a lot of heterogeneity. Southern European countries tend to
have a higher index value than Northern and Central European countries or Eastern European
countries.
Importantly, the model presented in this paper can account for the negative relation found in
the data between output and in￿ ation volatility and labor turnover costs (see Section 3.5). We will
return to this point later on.
8Wilke 2005 shows, for example, for Germany that the job-￿nding rates (i.e., the probability of ￿nding a new job)
are much lower than the retention rates (i.e., the probability of retaining an existing job).
9Note that the undetrended in￿ ation rate delivers the same qualitative results and similar signi￿cance levels.
10Compared with other indicators, such as the Employment Legislation Index in Botero et al. (2003), or the hiring
and ￿ring costs calculated by the World Bank in its ￿Doing Business￿studies, the OECD￿ s indicator both covers a
larger range of relevant aspects of LTC, and has more precise and di⁄erentiated sub-indicators. Therefore, it is the
best available measure for the relative importance of LTCs in di⁄erent countries.



















































































Figure 1: Output gap volatility and employment protection legislation.





































































































Figure 2: In￿ ation volatility and employment protection legislation.
61998 2003 1998 2003
Eastern Europe Southern Europe
Czech Republic 1.94 1.94 Greece 3.49 2.90
Hungary 1.54 1.75 Italy 3.06 2.44
Poland 1.93 2.14 Portugal 3.66 3.49
Slovak Republic 2.20 1.70 Spain 2.96 3.06
AVERAGE 1.90 1.88 AVERAGE 3.29 2.97
Northern and Central Europe Anglo-saxon countries
Austria 2.38 2.15 Australia 1.47 1.47
Belgium 2.48 2.50 Canada 1.13 1.13
Denmark 1.83 1.83 Ireland 1.17 1.32
Finland 2.18 2.12 New Zealand 0.78 1.29
France 2.84 2.89 United Kingdom 0.98 1.10
Germany 2.64 2.47 United States 0.65 0.65
Netherlands 2.27 2.27
Norway 2.72 2.62 AVERAGE 1.03 1.16
Sweden 2.62 2.62
Switzerland 1.60 1.60 Rest of the world
Japan 1.94 1.79
AVERAGE 2.36 2.31 Korea 2.00 2.00
Mexico 3.23 3.23
Turkey 3.40 3.49
Figure 3: Version 2 of the EPL, including protection against collective dismissals. Source:
OECD.Stat, originally published in the OECD (1999 and 2004).
3 The Model
Our model grafts a labor market with labor turnover costs, wage bargaining, and employed and
unemployed workers onto a New Keynesian framework with Rotemberg adjustment costs. To
endogenize hiring and ￿ring decisions, it is assumed that the pro￿tability of each worker is subject
to an i.i.d. shock each period. Firms can change their price in any period but price changes are
subject to quadratic adjustment costs a la Rotemberg 1982.
3.1 Households









where ￿ is the household￿ s discount factor, ￿ the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, c a
consumption aggregate (described below)11 and E is the expectations operator.
11In what follows capital letters refer to nominal variables and small letters refer to real variables (i.e., de-trended
by the price level).
7As common in the literature,12 it is assumed that each household consists of a large number
of individuals, each individual supplies one unit of labor inelastically and shares all income with
the other household members. This implies that consumption does not depend on a worker￿ s
employment status. Thus, the representative household maximizes its utility subject to the budget
constraint:
Bot + ctPt ￿ Tt = WtNt + bUt + (1 + it￿1)Bot￿1 + ￿a;t, (2)
where Bo are nominal holdings of one period discounted bonds, P is the aggregate price level, T are
tax payments, i is the nominal interest rate, ￿a are nominal aggregate pro￿ts, which are transferred
in lump-sum manner, W is the nominal wage, N is the total household labor input, b the income
of unemployed workers,13 and U the number of unemployed workers. The inter-temporal utility








where ￿t+1 is the expected in￿ ation rate.
Note that, as in a large part of the recent literature, money plays the role of nominal unit of
account.14 The assumption of a cashless economy implies that zero in￿ ation will be an optimal
outcome in the long-run. Departure from price stability occurs in the short-run, as the monetary
authority responds to productivity and government expenditure shocks in order to reduce the
impact of labor market wedges.
3.2 Production and the Labor Market
There are three types of ￿rms. (i) Firms producing intermediate goods employ labor, exhibit
linear labor turnover costs (i.e., hiring and ￿ring costs) and sell their homogenous products on a
perfectly competitive market to the wholesale sector. (ii) Firms in the wholesale sector transform
the intermediate goods into consumption goods and sell them under monopolistic competition to the
12See Andolfatto 1995 and Merz 1996.
13The variable b can either be interpreted as home production or as unemployment bene￿ts provided by the
government (￿nanced by lump-sum taxes).
14See Woodford 2003, chapter 3. Thus the present model may be viewed as approximating the limiting case of a
money-in-the-utility model in which the weight of real balances in the utility function is arbitrarily close to zero.
8retailers. They can change their price at any time but price adjustments are subject to a quadratic
adjustment cost a la Rotemberg 1982. (iii) The retailers, in turn, aggregate the consumption goods
and sell them under perfect competition to the households.
3.2.1 Intermediate Goods Producers and Employment Dynamics
Intermediate good ￿rms hire labor to produce the intermediate good z. Their production function
is:
zt = atNt; (4)
where a is technology and N the number of employed workers. They sell the product at a relative
price mct = Pz;t=Pt, which they take as given in a perfectly competitive environment, where Pz is
the absolute price of the intermediate good and P is the economy￿ s overall price level. The variable
mct in this economy plays the role of marginal costs as it represents the Lagrange multiplier on the
production function.
We assume that every worker (employed or unemployed) is subject to a random operating
cost ", which follows a logistic probability distribution g("t) over the support ￿1 to +1.15 The
operating costs can be interpreted as a worker-￿rm pair speci￿c idiosyncratic cost-shock. Assume
an economy with a large number of ￿rms and workers (with a lot more workers than ￿rms).16 Each
period all unemployed workers are distributed randomly across ￿rms and then draw a realization
from the shock distribution. When they draw a bad realization of the shock, they stay unemployed
and get assigned to another ￿rm the next period. For simplicity, we assume that the employed
workers draw realizations from the same shock distribution.
The ￿rms learn the value of the operating costs of every worker at the beginning of a period
and base their employment decisions on it, i.e., an unemployed worker with a favorable shock will be
employed while an employed worker with a bad shock will be ￿red. Hiring and ￿ring is not costless,
￿rms have to pay linear hiring costs, h, and linear ￿ring costs, f, both measured in terms of the ￿nal
15The logistic distribution was chosen because it is very similar to the normal distribution, but in contrast to the
latter has a neat expression for the cumulative density function.
16Note that we do not have to specify the number of workers and ￿rms, as long as there a lot more workers than
￿rms. In this case, all ￿rms face the same shock distribution with respect to their workers (due to the law of large
numbers) and thus they are completely identical.
9consumption good. Wages are determined through Nash bargaining between incumbent workers
and the ￿rm. The bargaining process takes the form of a right to manage. This assumption leads
to the following timing of events. First, the operating cost shock takes place and median workers
and the intermediate goods ￿rm bargain over the wage. Given the wage schedule, ￿rms make their
hiring and ￿ring decisions. Thus, ￿rms will only hire those workers who face low operating costs
and ￿re those workers who face high operating costs.
The hiring and ￿ring costs induce two types of distortions (a gap and a time-varying wedge).
The presence of hiring and ￿ring costs reduces labor turnover at any period in time compared to
a Walrasian labor market, thereby inducing a gap between the perfectly competitive economy and
our non-Walrasian labor market. Second, our model features an inter-temporal wedge that distorts
hiring and ￿ring decisions between two sub-sequent periods. Indeed, once workers are inside the
￿rm they are ￿red only if the discounted stream of future pro￿ts is smaller than the ￿ring costs, on
the other side ￿rms will hire only if the discounted value of future pro￿ts is bigger than the hiring
costs. Due to the labor turnover costs, the retention rate, de￿ned as the mass of workers who keep
their jobs, is always bigger than the ￿ring rate.
The operating costs, ", are measured in terms of the ￿nal consumption good and are assumed
to grow at the same rate as productivity.17 It turns out that this ensures that technological progress
does not a⁄ect the unemployment rate.
Let￿ s now consider the real pro￿t generated by a ￿rm-worker pair whose operating costs are
"t:































where w is the real wage, ￿ is the separation probability, ￿t;j is the stochastic discount factor from
period t to j. To simplify the pro￿t function let￿ s rewrite it in recursive manner:
17For permanent technology shocks, it can be assumed the the operating, hiring and ￿ring costs grow at the
same rate as the technological progress. This ensures that the hiring and ￿ring rates are independent of long-run
technological growth (see Lechthaler, Merkl, and Snower 2008). As we only consider mean-reverting technology
shocks in this paper, we skip this assumption for analytical simplicity.
10~ ￿I;t("t) = atmct ￿ wt ￿ "t + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); (6)
where ~ ￿I;t+1("t+1) are future pro￿ts.
Using the pro￿t functions, it is possible to derive the hiring and ￿ring decisions, hence the
employment dynamics. Because of the abovementioned timing of events, the model is solved back-
ward and hiring and ￿ring decisions are obtained for a given wage schedule. Let￿ s de￿ne the hiring
and the ￿ring threshold respectively as ￿h;t and ￿f;t: Unemployed workers are hired whenever their
operating cost does not exceed a certain threshold such that the pro￿tability of this worker is
higher than the hiring cost. Thus, the hiring threshold, ￿h;t, is obtained by solving the following
zero pro￿t condition:
h = atmct ￿ wt ￿ ￿h;t + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)): (7)
Unemployed workers whose operating cost is lower than this value get a job, while those whose





Similarly, the ￿rm will ￿re a worker if current losses are higher than the ￿ring cost. Again a zero
pro￿t condition de￿nes the ￿ring threshold as follows:
￿f = atmct ￿ wt ￿ ￿f;t + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); (9)





The change in employment (Nt ￿ Nt￿1) is the di⁄erence between hirings from the unemploy-
ment pool (￿Ut￿1) and ￿rings from the employment pool (￿Nt￿1), where Ut￿1 and Nt￿1 are the
aggregate unemployment and employment levels: Nt￿Nt￿1 = ￿Ut￿1￿￿Nt￿1. Letting (nt = Nt=Lt)
be the employment rate, we assume a constant workforce, Lt, and normalize it to one. Therefore,
the employment dynamics read as follows:
11nt = nt￿1(1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t) + ￿t: (11)
The unemployment rate is simply ut = 1 ￿ nt.
3.2.2 Wage Bargaining
For simplicity, let the real wage wt be the outcome of a Nash bargain between the median worker18
with operating cost "I and her ￿rm. The median worker faces no risk of dismissal at the negotiated
wage. The wage is renegotiated in each period t. Under bargaining agreement, the median worker
receives the real wage wt and the ￿rm receives the expected pro￿t (atmct ￿ wt) in each period t.
Under disagreement, the worker￿ s fallback income is bt, assumed for simplicity to be equal to the
real unemployment bene￿t. The ￿rm￿ s fallback position is ￿s, where s is the cost for the ￿rm in
case of disagreement. This may be a ￿xed cost of non-production or a cost that is imposed due to a
strike. Assuming that disagreement in the current period does not a⁄ect future surpluses, workers￿
surplus is (wt ￿bt) while the ￿rm￿ s surplus is aI
tmc￿wt ￿"I +s, where "I are the operating costs
of the median worker. Consequently, the Nash-product is:
￿ = (wt ￿ b)
￿ ￿
aI
tmc ￿ wt ￿ "I + s
￿1￿￿
; (12)
where ￿ represents the bargaining strength of the worker relative to the ￿rm. Maximizing the
Nash-product with respect to the real wage, yields the following equation:
(1 ￿ ￿)(wt ￿ b) = ￿
￿










+ (1 ￿ ￿)b: (14)
It is worth noting that, due to the right to manage structures, ex-ante wages do not adjust
e¢ ciently to shocks compared to wages negotiated within e¢ cient Nash bargaining arrangements.
In e¢ cient Nash bargaining, individual ￿rms would have to choose wages alongside with hiring and
18For simplicity, we allow the median worker to bargain over wages. Alternative settings, such as individual bar-
gaining process with marginal workers, would not change the main implications of the model.
12￿ring decisions. This would allow wages to be contingent on employment decisions and to adjust
faster to shocks. Instead, in this context wages are negotiated at an aggregate level and ￿rms
make hiring and ￿ring decisions only ex-post.19 This implies, for instance, that negative shocks
can a⁄ect worker ￿ ows more strongly than wages. Such a bargaining arrangement can capture well
the reality of euro area labor markets in which wages are usually bargained ex-ante at an aggregate
level (collectively), while individual ￿rms make ex-post hiring and ￿ring decision.
3.2.3 Marginal costs
Marginal costs in this model summarize the set of wedges that characterize the labor market. To
obtain a measure of the marginal cost we should ￿rst characterize the equilibrium conditions for
labor market ￿ ows. By merging equations 7 and 9 we obtain the following equilibrium condition:
￿h;t + h = ￿f;t ￿ f; (15)
which states that if hiring costs happen to be higher than hiring costs the hiring threshold should
adjust to equilibrate the market. This condition implies that marginal costs can be equally derived
from 7 or from 9. The expression for marginal costs will then read as follows:
mct =
￿
wt + ￿f;t ￿ f ￿ Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1))
￿
=at: (16)
In this context wages loose part of their allocative role as marginal costs depend also on two
additional components. The ￿rst component, which is given by ￿f;t￿f is an intra-temporal wedge
which makes hiring (and ￿ring) deviate from the ones that would arise in a Walrasian labor market
at any time t: The second component, represented by Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)); is an inter-temporal
wedge which distorts hiring (and ￿ring) decisions between two sub-sequent dates. This second
wedge represents the long run value of a worker as by retaining the marginal worker the ￿rm
can earn extra pro￿ts in the future. Because of this positive externality attached to the marginal
worker, retention rates tend to be higher than job ￿nding rates.
19This is a particular case of a sequential bargaining framework proposed by Manning 1987, as ￿rms and workers
fail to internalize the consequences of today·s wage decisions on future hiring and ￿ring decisions. The scope for
pre-commitment is barred as neither workers nor ￿rms can credibly commit to a sequence of future wages and
employment.
133.2.4 Wholesale Sector and Retail Sector
Firms in the wholesale sector are distributed on the unit interval and indexed by i. They produce a
di⁄erentiated good yi;t using the linear production technology yi;t = zi;t, where zi;t is their demand
for intermediate goods. They sell their goods under monopolistic competition to the retailers who




























Firms in the wholesale-sector can change their prices every period, facing quadratic price
adjustment costs a la Rotemberg. They maximize the following pro￿t function:


















where ￿ is a parameter measuring the extent of price adjustment costs, which are due whenever
there are price changes (i.e., whenever Pi;j=Pi;j￿1 is di⁄erent from 1). Taking the derivative with
respect to the price yields, after some manipulations, the following expectational Phillips curve:





143.3 Workers￿Heterogeneity and Aggregation
Let￿ s start by deriving aggregate real pro￿ts of intermediate ￿rms which are given by revenues
minus wage payments, operating costs and labor turnover costs:
~ ￿I = mctatnt ￿ wtnt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)nt￿i
t ￿ (22)
(1 ￿ nt)￿t￿e
t ￿ nt￿tf ￿ (1 ￿ nt)￿th;
where ￿i
t is the expected value of operating costs for incumbent workers, conditional on not being
￿red and ￿e














The real pro￿ts (~ ￿W) of the wholesale sector are given by:





Retailers make zero-pro￿ts. Aggregate real pro￿ts in this economy therefore are given by:








We can substitute this into the budget constraint, (2), and after imposing equilibrium in the bond
market and using the government budget constraint (gt + BtUt = Tt) we obtain the following
resource constraint:








15Note that ￿nal aggregate demand includes government expenditure, gt; which follows an ex-
ogenous AR(1) process.
Inspection of the resource constraint shows that the presence of hiring and ￿ring costs as well
as of price adjustment costs induces a waste of resources. Indeed setting hiring and ￿ring costs to
zero would increase output by an amount equal to nt￿ftat ￿ (1 ￿ nt)￿th; while setting in￿ ation
equal to zero would increase resources of an amount equal to ￿
2 (￿t ￿ 1)
2 yt:
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium and the Role of Wedges in This Economy
De￿nition 1. For a given nominal interest rate fitg1
t=0 and for a given set of the exogenous
processes fat;gtg1
t=0 a determinate competitive equilibrium for the distorted competitive economy
is a sequence of allocations and prices fct;￿t;mct;￿h;t;￿t;￿f;t;￿t;wt;ytg1
t=0 which, for given initial
B0 satis￿es equations 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 21, 24.
The competitive equilibrium in this economy is distorted by the wedges induced by hiring and
￿ring costs and by the inability of wages to adjust promptly to idiosyncratic shocks. In equilib-
rium this makes unemployment ￿ uctuations to deviate from the e¢ cient ones. Hence the monetary
authority faces a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing prices and reducing ine¢ cient unemployment ￿ uctu-
ations.
The role of monetary policy trade-o⁄s in this economy can be well understood by deriving the
reduced form expression for the Phillips curve. By substituting the marginal cost expression, 16,
into the Phillips curve, equation 21, we obtain the following expression:
0 = (1 ￿ ")+
"
at





which together with the wage equation, 13, leads to a reduced form Phillips curve (in log-linear
terms):


















A comparison between the latter reduced form and the one arising in standard New Keynesian












Endogenous cost push shock
Standard Taylor rule
Price stabiltiy
Figure 4: Reaction of the endogenous cost-push shock (in percent) due to a productivity shock
under two di⁄erent monetary policy regimes (standard Taylor rule and price stability).
models with Walrasian labor markets allows to highlight the nature of the monetary policy trade-
o⁄s. In standard New Keynesian models the Phillips curve takes the following form:
0 = (1 ￿ ") + "(
wt
at




In response to a productivity shock the marginal cost is una⁄ected as wt moves one to one
with the shock. This implies that in￿ ation is una⁄ected too and that monetary policy should
stay passive. In this context price stability policy allows the policy maker to achieve the ￿ exible
price allocation, which also corresponds to the Pareto optimal allocation. On the the other side in
equation 25 the extra component represented by ￿f;t ￿f ￿Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)) plays the role of
an endogenous cost push shock (ECPS). Consider a monetary policy which follows a price stability
rule.20 Under this policy the ECPS increases in response to positive productivity shocks (see ￿gure
4, where the calibration of the parameters follows the one described in section 4.2).
Indeed, in response to positive productivity shocks both the ￿ring threshold, ￿f;t; and future
pro￿ts, ~ ￿I;t+1, increase. However since the ￿ring threshold rises more than future pro￿ts, marginal
20We model this by setting the weight on in￿ ation in the Taylor rule to 100.
17costs, hence in￿ ation, rise. In this context the ￿ exible price allocation is simply not feasible any
longer.
Proposition 1. For the model economy described in De￿nition 1, a ￿exible price allocation
with constant employment is not implementable and is not optimal.
Proof. The monetary authority achieves the ￿ exible price allocation by following a zero




(wt + ￿f;t ￿ f ￿ Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)))
at
. (28)
Consider a reference economy in which the labor market achieves full employment. In this
case, employment does not change (as it is already at the full employment level) for any increase





f ￿ f ￿ Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1))
at
. (29)
Lets￿now consider condition 28 under the wage schedule that would arise when each worker




(￿at + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f;t + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ f ￿ Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)))
at
. (30)
When employment is below the full employment level, changes in productivity lead to changes
in employment, hence in marginal costs. This implies that in our model the allocation with constant
mark-up is never implementable and does not lead to full employment.
The fact that employment changes in response to productivity shocks implies that the model
features a time-varying wedge which cannot be o⁄-set by a constant ￿scal subsidy. Hence only a
constrained Pareto e¢ cient allocation can be achieved by a policy maker which maximizes agents￿
utility given the constraints of the competitive economy. Such an optimization problem leads
to shock contingent policy actions that allow to smooth ine¢ cient unemployment ￿ uctuations.
To understand the transmission mechanism through which the monetary authority can increase
employment, let￿ s get back to equation 5 and write the zero pro￿t condition at the hiring threshold,
~ ￿I;t("t) = h as:































For given hiring costs the monetary authority can increase the hiring threshold (therefore
employment) by increasing current and future ￿rms￿marginal revenues, at+imct+i. When prices
are sticky an increase in demand, achieved through monetary policy easing, reduces mark-ups and
increases marginal costs, hence revenues. For given hiring costs, an increase in marginal costs leads
to an increase in the hiring threshold, hence in employment.
3.5 Dynamic Properties of the Model
Before turning to the main focus of the paper, the design of optimal monetary policy, it is worth
to verify the ability of the model to replicate the empirical evidence on labor turnover costs and
macroeconomic volatilities. This makes the model suitable for policy analysis. Figure 5 shows
output and in￿ ation responses to a productivity shock with auto-correlation 0:95 under a standard
Taylor rule and under three di⁄erent ￿ring cost levels (fc = 0:5;0:6;and 0:7). The calibration of the
parameters follows the one described in section 4.2. The graph shows that the model persistence
(volatility) increases (decreases) with the level of ￿ring costs.
To make our model results comparable to the empirical graphs shown further above, we calcu-
late the model￿ s HP-￿ltered standard deviation for a joint productivity and government spending
shock under the di⁄erent ￿ring cost levels. Figures 6 and 7 show the results. In our model, the
volatility of output and in￿ ation, both decrease when we increase the ￿ring costs. The absolute
value of the volatilities generated by the model is very close to the absolute value shown in the
data. The negative relation between the volatilities and the ￿ring costs captures quite closely the
one in the data.21
21Note however that a direct comparison between 6 and 7 and the empirical counterparts is not possible as the
measure of the hiring costs in the data is only a qualitative indicator that does not ￿nd an exact correspondence in
the ￿ring costs as calibrated in the model. See section 4.2 for a description of the calibration of the ￿ring costs in
the model.






























Figure 5: Model reaction under di⁄erent ￿ring costs








































































Figure 6: Changes in the volatility of output with respect to changes on the ￿ring costs, under
Taylor rules and both, productivity and government expenditure shocks.









































































Figure 7: Changes in the volatility of in￿ ation with respect to changes on the ￿ring costs, under
Taylor rules and both, productivity and government expenditure shocks.
4 Optimal Ramsey Policy
This section turns to the speci￿cation of a general set-up for the optimal policy conduct. The
optimal policy plan is determined by a monetary authority that maximizes the discounted sum of
utilities of all agents given the constraints of the competitive economy. The next task is to select
the relations that represent the relevant constraints in the planner￿ s optimal policy problem. This
amounts to describing the competitive equilibrium in terms of a minimal set of relations involving
only real allocations, in the spirit of the primal approach described in Lucas and Stokey 1983. There
is a fundamental di⁄erence, though, between that classic approach and the one followed here, which
stems from the impossibility, in the presence of sticky prices and other frictions, of reducing the
planner￿ s problem to a maximization only subject to a single implementability constraint. Khan,
King and Wolman 2003 adopt a similar structure to analyze optimal monetary policy in a closed
economy with market power, price stickiness and monetary frictions, while Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe 2004 analyze a problem of joint determination of optimal monetary and ￿scal policy.
21atmct ￿ wt ￿ ￿h;t + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)) = h (32)
atmct ￿ wt ￿ ￿f;t + Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1)) = ￿f (33)






+ (1 ￿ ￿)b (35)
0 = ytuc;t[(1 ￿ ") + "(mct) ￿ ￿(￿t ￿ 1)￿t] + Etfuc;t+1￿(￿t+1 ￿ 1)yt+1￿t+1g (36)








The government resource constraint does not need to be included among the equilibrium
conditions as ￿scal policy is passive (lump sum taxation).
De￿nition 2. Let ￿n
t = f￿1;t;￿2;t;￿3;t;￿4;t;￿5;t;￿6;tg1
t=0 represent the sequence of Lagrange
multipliers on the constraints (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37). Then for a given stochastic process
fat;gtg1
t=0, plans for the control variables ￿n
t ￿ fct;nt;wt;mct;￿t;vh;t;vf;tg1




t=0 represent a ￿rst best constrained allocation if they












subject to (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37).
4.1 Non-Recursivity and Initial Conditions
As a result of constraints (32), (33) and (36) exhibiting future expectations of control variables,
the maximization problem as spelled out in (38) is intrinsically non-recursive. As ￿rst emphasized
in Kydland and Prescott 1980, and then developed by Marcet and Marimon 1999, a formal way
to rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the planner￿ s state space
with additional (pseudo) co-state variables. Such variables, that we denote ￿1;t, ￿2;t and ￿3;t for
(32), (33) and (36) respectively, bear the crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the
value to the planner of committing to the pre-announced policy plan. Another aspect concerns the
22speci￿cation of the law of motion of these Lagrange multipliers. For in this case both constraints










Using the new co-state variables so far described we amplify the state space of the Ramsey
allocation to be fat;￿1;t;￿2;t;￿5;tg1
t=0 and we de￿ne a new saddle point problem which is recursive
in the new state space. Consistently with a timeless perspective we set the values of the three
co-state variables at time zero equal to their solution in the steady state.
4.2 Model Calibration
The calibration is summarized in table 1 below.
Preferences. The discount rate , ￿; is set to 0:99; consistently with an annual interest rate of
4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ￿ is set to 2. The elasticity of substitution
between di⁄erent product types, ", is set to 10 (see, e.g., Gal￿ 2008).
Pricing. The parameter of price adjustments, ￿, is calibrated in line with microeconometric
evidence for Europe (see Alvarez et al. 2006).
Labor markets. The bargaining power of workers, ￿, is set to a benchmark value of 0:5.
Taking continental Europe as reference point, the ￿ring costs are set to 60 percent (f = 0:6) of
the annual productivity which amounts to approximately 66 percent of the annual wage22 and the
hiring costs are set to 10 percent (h = 0:1) of annual productivity (see Chen and Funke 2003). The
unemployment bene￿ts is set to 65 percent of the level of productivity (b = 0:65). This implies, that
in steady state the wage replacement rate is roughly 71 percent, which is in line with evidence for
continental European countries (see OECD 2007). Operating costs are assumed to follow a logistic
22For the period from 1975 to 1986 Bentolila and Bertola 1990 calculate ￿ring costs of 92 percent, 75 percent and
108 percent of the respective annual wage in France, Germany and Italy respectively. The OECD 2004 reports that
many European countries have reduced their job security legislation somewhat from the late 1980 to 2003 (in terms
of the overall employment protection legislation strictness). Therefore, we consider f = 0:6 to be a realistic number
for continental European countries.
23distribution with zero mean. The scaling parameter of the distribution and the payments under
disagreement, s, are chosen in such a way that the resulting labor market ￿ ow rates match the
empirical hiring and ￿ring rates described further below. This yields a scale parameter of 0:53 and
payments under disagreement slightly below 0:28. We calibrate our ￿ ow rates using evidence for
West Germany, as there are only Kaplan-Meier functions for individual countries.23 Wilke￿ s 2005
Kaplan-Meier functions indicate that about 20 percent of the unemployed leave their status after
one quarter. For a steady state unemployment rate of 9 percent, a quarterly job ￿nding rate of 2
percent is necessary. This is roughly in line with Wilke￿ s estimated yearly risk of unemployment.
The used ￿ ow numbers are in line with the OECD, 2004, numbers for other continental European
countries.24. Hence a quarterly job hiring rate of ￿ = 0:20 and a ￿ring rate of ￿ = 0:02 are
reasonable averages for continental European countries.
Shocks. We parameterize the shock processes in line with evidence for industrialized countries.
Productivity shocks follow an AR(1) process. The autocorrelation is set to 0:95 and the standard













t; where the steady-state share of government consumption, g;
is set so that
g
y = 0:25 and "
g
t is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation ￿g. We set ￿g = 0:0074
and ￿g = 0:9 (see, e.g., Perotti 2004).
4.3 Optimal Policy in the Long run
Before turning to the analysis of the dynamic path of the optimal policy plan in response to shocks,
this section characterizes the log-run optimal policy. Long-run optimal policy is represented by the
steady state around which the dynamic optimal plan evolves. In analogy with the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model, such steady state amounts to computing the modi￿ed golden rule steady state25.
The unconstrained optimal long-run rate of in￿ ation (arising from the modi￿ed golden rule) is
23We choose the Kaplan-Meier functions for Germany, as it is the largest continental European country.
24Although the numbers of the OECD outlook are not directly applicable to our model, since they are built on a
monthly basis, it is possible to adjust them using a method described in Shimer 2007.
25Notice that an important distinction must be made between the optimal level of in￿ ation characterizing the
modi￿ed golden rule and the one characterizing the golden rule (See also King and Wolman 1996). In dynamic
economies with discounted utility in fact the two level of in￿ ations do not necessarily coincide. The golden rule level
of in￿ ation is the one that maximizes households￿instantaneous utility under the constraint that the steady state
conditions are imposed ex-ante. The impatience re￿ ected in the rate of time preferences gives rise to a negatively
sloped long run Phillips curve which by constraining the optimal policy problem maintains alive the tension between
closing the in￿ ation gap on the one side and the ine¢ cient unemployment gap on the other.
24Table 1: Parameters of the Numerical Model
Parameter Description Value Source
￿ Subjective discount factor 0.99 Standard value
￿ Consumption utility 2 Intertemp. elasticity of subst.
" Elasticity of subst. 10 Gali 2008
￿ Price adjustment cost 104.85 Equivalent to ￿ = 0:75
a Productivity 1 Normalization
￿ Workers￿bargaining power 0.5 Standard value
f Firing cost 0.6 Bentolila and Bertola 1990
h Hiring cost 0.1 Chen and Funke 2003
b Unemployment bene￿ts 0.65 OECD 2007
E(") Expected value of op. costs 0 Normalization
sd Distr. scaling parameter 0.53 To match the ￿ ow rates
s Payments under disagreement 0.28 To match the ￿ ow rates
the one to which the planner would like the economy to converge to if allowed to undertake its
optimization unconditionally. It is obtained by imposing steady state conditions ex-post on the
￿rst order conditions of the Ramsey plan. Let￿ s focus on the ￿rst order condition with respect to
in￿ ation which reads as follows:
(￿5;t ￿ ￿5;t)c￿￿
t  (2￿t ￿ 1) ￿ ￿6;t  (￿t ￿ 1) = 0 (40)
For the whole set of optimality conditions associated with the Ramsey plan to be satis￿ed at
the steady state a necessary condition is that equation (40) is satis￿ed at the steady state. In that
steady-state ￿5;t = ￿5;t￿1 = ￿5;t. Hence condition (40) immediately implies:
￿6  (￿ ￿ 1) = 0 (41)
Since ￿6 > 0 (the resource constraint must hold with equality), and   > 0 (we are not imposing
a priori that the steady-state coincides with the ￿ exible price allocation), in turn (41) must imply
￿ = 1. Hence the Ramsey planner would like to generate an average (net) in￿ ation rate of zero.
The intuition for why the long-run optimal in￿ ation rate is zero is simple. Under commitment, the
planner cannot resort to ex-post in￿ ation as a device for eliminating the ine¢ ciency related to the
goods and labor markets. Hence the planner aims at choosing that rate of in￿ ation that allows to
minimize the cost of adjusting prices as summarized by the quadratic term #
2 (￿t ￿ 1)
2.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of Ramsey plan to productivity shocks (under two di⁄erent ￿ring
costs).
4.4 Response to Shocks and Optimal Volatility of In￿ ation
To compute responses of the optimal plan to shocks we resort on second order approximations26
of the ￿rst order conditions of the Lagrangian problem described in de￿nition 2. Technically, we
compute the stationary allocation that characterizes the deterministic steady state of the ￿rst order
conditions to the Ramsey plan. We then compute a second order approximation of the respective
policy functions in the neighborhood of the same steady state. This amounts to implicitly assuming
that the economy has been evolving and policy has been conducted around such a steady state
already for a long period of time (under timeless perspective).
Figure 8 shows impulse response functions of the Ramsey plan to positive productivity shocks.
In response to an increase in productivity consumption, output and employment increase. The
￿ring threshold increases, implying a reduction in the mass of ￿rings. On the other side the hiring
threshold falls implying an increase in the mass of hiring. Most importantly in￿ ation deviates
26Second order approximation methods have the particular advantage of accounting for the e⁄ects of volatility of
variables on the mean levels of the same. See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) among others.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses of Ramsey allocation to government expenditure shocks (under two
di⁄erent ￿ring costs)
signi￿cantly from zero and falls, implying that monetary policy behaves pro-cyclically. The mone-
tary authority in this context has a trade-o⁄ between stabilizing in￿ ation and reducing ine¢ cient
unemployment ￿ uctuations. The latter task can be accomplished by taking full advantage of the
improved production possibilities. Therefore in response to an improvement in the production
possibilities, the monetary authority reduces in￿ ation to increase aggregate demand. Under sticky
prices an increase in aggregate demand increases marginal costs, reduces the mark-ups and increases
labor demand. For given hiring and ￿ring costs, the increase in labor demand translates into an
increase in the hiring threshold and a decrease of the ￿ring threshold, as shown by conditions 7 and
9. Importantly and contrary to traditional New Keynesian models, deviations from price stability
arise in this model even in response to productivity shocks. This is so since in this model the
marginal costs features an extra component, "
at(wt +￿f;t ￿f ￿Et(￿t;t+1~ ￿I;t+1("t+1))); which acts
as an endogenous cost push shock and responds to productivity shocks (see also equation 26).
Larger hiring and ￿ring costs lead to larger time-varying wedges and larger ine¢ cient unem-
ployment ￿ uctuations, hence they boost the incentives of the policy maker to deviate from the zero



















































Figure 10: Optimal in￿ ation volatility in response to the two shocks
in￿ ation policy. This can be seen from ￿gure 10 which shows that the optimal volatility of in￿ ation,
in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks, increases when ￿ring costs
increase. In our model time-varying wedges are mapped into ￿rms￿rents, hence the monetary
authority uses the only available instrument, in￿ ation, to tax ￿rms￿rents.
Finally, ￿gure 9 shows impulse responses of the Ramsey plan in response to government expen-
diture shocks. An increase in government expenditure crowds out consumption demand. However
because of the increase in aggregate demand employment increases, the mass of ￿rings shrinks and
the mass of hiring rises. Once again deviations from price stability arise. This result is consistent
with the literature, as Adao, Correia and Teles 2003 and Khan, King and Wolman 2003 have shown
that shocks to government expenditure cause ￿ uctuations in the ratio between aggregate demand
and output which prevent implementability of the ￿ exible price allocation with constant mark-ups.
Notice however that consistently with previous studies deviations from zero in￿ ation are rather
small under this shock.
285 Optimal Operational Rules
So far our analysis indicated what should be the optimal path of variables if the economy had been
run by a Ramsey planner. Now we follow a Tinbergen approach and ask what type of operational27
rules central bankers should follow in the context of our model if they want to maximize agents·
welfare. We therefore solve the problem of a monetary authority which maximizes households






























where ￿￿ represents a response to the CPI in￿ ation rate, ￿y represents a response to the output gap,
￿n represents the response to unemployment and ￿r represents interest rate smoothing. Within
this class of rules, we look for the coe¢ cients which deliver the highest level of welfare. Note that
we allow interest rates to react to unemployment alongside with in￿ ation. The reason for that is
as follows. In our model the policy maker faces a trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and unemployment
stabilization due to the ine¢ ciencies associated with the labor market. Because of this we expect
a rule targeting unemployment alongside with in￿ ation to perform better than a rule neglecting
labor market variables.
Some observations on the computation of welfare in this context are in order. First, one
cannot safely rely on standard ￿rst order approximation methods to compare the relative welfare
associated to each monetary policy arrangement. Indeed in an economy with a distorted steady
state, stochastic volatility a⁄ects both ￿rst and second moments of those variables that are critical
for welfare. Hence policy arrangements can be correctly ranked only by resorting to a higher
order approximation of the policy functions.28 Additionally one needs to focus on the conditional
expected discounted utility of the representative agent. This allows to account for the transitional
e⁄ects from the deterministic to the di⁄erent stochastic steady states respectively implied by each
27The word operational indicates two things: a) a rule that responds to variables which can be easily observed and
b) a rule that delivers real determinacy.
28See Kim and Kim 2003 for an analysis of the inaccuracy of welfare calculations based on log-linear approximations





















































Figure 11: Optimal response to in￿ ation and employment
alternative policy rule. De￿ne ￿ as the fraction of household￿ s consumption that would be needed
to equate conditional welfare W0 under a generic interest rate policy to the level of welfare f W0








Under a given speci￿cation of utility one can solve for ￿ and obtain:
￿ = exp
n￿





In our simulations, we search for the rule that maximizes welfare29. In response to both
productivity and government expenditure shocks the optimal rule features the following coe¢ cients:
29The search grid is set as follows: ￿r = [0;0:9];￿￿ = [0;3];￿n = [0;1]: The coe¢ cient on output is set to zero, as
any positive value decreases the welfare gains for any combination of the other parameters.
30￿r = 0:9;￿￿ = 3;￿y = 0;￿n = 0:2. Several results arise. First, the optimal rule must respond to
employment, alongside with in￿ ation, to smooth ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations. The response to output is
welfare detrimental. As shown in previous literature (see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004, Faia and
Monacelli 2004) responding to output might be welfare detrimental if an appropriate measure of
the output gap is not available. Third, the optimal rule is characterized by a signi￿cant degree of
interest rate smoothing: the excess volatility generated by the labor market frictions requires the
monetary authority to take over a stabilization role.
Figure 11 shows the welfare gain of responding to in￿ ation and employment: the gains reach
a maximum when the response to employment is at 0.2 and decrease after that. The graph also
shows that, for any level of the response to employment, it is always welfare improving an aggressive
response to in￿ ation. Hence stabilizing prices remains an important goal to achieve within the set
de￿ned by the operational rules.
6 Conclusions
The design of optimal monetary policy is derived in a DSGE model with sticky prices, labor turnover
costs and right-to-manage bargaining. The model assumptions are meant to capture the reality
of Euro area labor markets. The type of labor market frictions considered give rise to non-trivial
trade-o⁄s for the monetary authority. Optimal policy features deviations from price stability and
those deviations are larger the larger the size of ￿ring costs. The optimal operational rule should
respond to unemployment alongside with in￿ ation.
This paper provides a theoretical and a policy contribution. From a theoretical point of view
our analysis shows that the case for price stability can be challenged if one considers a model
with a signi￿cant role for real frictions. Optimal monetary policy in the presence of real frictions
can be usefully characterized by applying a Ramsey-type analysis. Our analysis carries also some
important policy implications. Before the Lisbon agenda is brought to completion and structural
reforms in the labor market are implemented, an active role for the monetary authority is needed
to overcome some of the welfare costs generated by turnover costs and bargaining by incumbent
workers.
A natural extension of this analysis is to consider the role of labor turnover costs in a DSGE
31model for a currency area model. Euro area countries face signi￿cant di⁄erences in terms of labor
market institutions, particularly turnover costs and employment protection indices. An analysis of
those di⁄erences could shed light on the di⁄erential response of output and in￿ ation to common
monetary policy actions.
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